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Afghanistan's Taliban government said on January 24 an arrest warrant sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for its leaders was "politically motivated". LEHTIKUVA / AFP

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While Europe remains focused on US Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, the phone conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, and the February 18 talks between the US and Russian foreign ministers in Riyadh, the situation in Afghanistan receives little attention. Yet, it remains necessary to address.

The United States had previously acted unilaterally in Afghanistan before its recent approach to Ukraine and negotiations with Russia.

It negotiated directly with the Taliban in Doha, decided to withdraw its forces, and left European and NATO allies with no choice but to follow suit after two decades of war. The US did not provide any explanation to its allies for this decision.

European governments struggle to justify their involvement in Afghanistan to their own public. The same countries that deployed troops to remove the Taliban found themselves abandoning the country as the group returned to power. This has led to a decline in European interest in Afghanistan among decision-makers and research institutions.

The war in Ukraine has further pushed Afghanistan to the margins of European policy discussions. If Europe had examined the consequences of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan more closely, it might have approached the Ukraine war with greater caution regarding Washington’s actions.

The US decision to negotiate with Russia without Ukraine and Europe, as well as its withdrawal from Afghanistan, is part of a broader pattern. Other examples include Washington’s unilateral exit from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), though that is beyond the scope of this discussion.

After working in Afghanistan for more than 30 years, I believe the country is in a unique situation that requires the attention of European policymakers and think tanks. A review of Afghanistan’s current conditions is necessary:

  • More than three years have passed since the Taliban returned to power.
  • The Taliban controls the entire country and has maintained internal security.
  • No organised political or military force poses a serious challenge to Taliban rule.
  • The Taliban has banned poppy cultivation, reducing traditional drug production, but industrial drug production and trafficking have increased.
  • The Taliban has abandoned commitments made during negotiations regarding inclusive governance, ethnic representation, girls' education, and women's rights, returning to governance similar to the 1990s.
  • The government operates under an exclusive interpretation of Hanafi jurisprudence, heavily influenced by Pashtun ethnicity.
  • No international or regional consensus exists on how to engage with the Taliban.
  • Various countries host Taliban officials sanctioned by the UN Security Council.
  • Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have removed the Taliban from their lists of terrorist organisations, and Russia is moving in the same direction.
  • The UN Security Council has confirmed the presence of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
  • The United Nations has accused the Taliban of systematic human rights violations.
  • The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has requested the arrest of Taliban leaders and judges.
  • Natural disasters, including droughts, earthquakes, and floods, continue to affect Afghanistan. A flood in May last year killed 225 people and destroyed 2,800 houses.
  • The return of refugees and migrants to Afghanistan has created a humanitarian crisis.
  • Food security has deteriorated, affecting more than half of the population to varying degrees.

Based on these conditions, three scenarios can be outlined for the Taliban’s future in Afghanistan:

  1. Stabilisation of the Taliban and continuation of the status quo.
  2. Changes in governance, such as behavioural reforms, participatory rule, or inclusive government.
  3. Regime change through rebellion, civil war, or foreign intervention.

Under the first scenario, international recognition of the Taliban remains unlikely. Afghanistan would continue to face instability due to internal discontent, particularly regarding ethnic tensions, women's rights, and girls' education. Regional and global concerns over terrorism would prevent full cooperation with the Taliban, making this situation unsustainable.

The second scenario involves governance reforms to the extent that Afghanistan’s internal conditions allow. This would be more acceptable to neighbouring countries and the broader international community. Greater ethnic representation and improved governance could increase internal stability and strengthen Afghanistan’s borders.

The third scenario—civil war, rebellion, or foreign intervention—would be the worst outcome for Afghanistan and the region. No country in the region favours renewed conflict, as instability in Afghanistan would increase security threats and terrorism risks.

Europe has three options regarding Afghanistan:

  1. Support opposition groups to overthrow the Taliban.
  2. Isolate the Taliban while adopting a wait-and-see approach.
  3. Cooperate with regional and neighbouring countries to influence Taliban governance.

The first option is not viable. Europe lacks the necessary capacity, Afghanistan lacks a strong opposition, and the regional environment does not permit such an approach.

The second option—Taliban isolation—is also impractical. The experience of Taliban rule in the 1990s showed that Afghanistan’s isolation contributed to the events of September 11.

The third option, cooperation with regional actors engaging with the Taliban, is the most realistic. Europe should develop an independent policy towards Afghanistan based on interaction with the Taliban through regional partners.

Seyed Rasoul Mousavi

Iranian diplomat and former ambassador of Iran to Finland and Estonia, expert in South Asian affairs


This is a "Viewpoint" opinion column. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of The Helsinki Times. This column is not fact checked and HT is not be responsible for any possible inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article.

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