Iran and Europe remain divided over how to rebuild mutual trust and sustain dialogue. Talks between representatives from both sides continue, and there is discussion of reopening diplomatic channels in Tehran and European capitals. However, the absence of trust and a framework for confidence-building undermines any potential for clarity in the future of their relations.
Europe is dissatisfied with Iran’s actions regarding its nuclear commitments, particularly what it sees as Iran’s neglect of its obligations under the JCPOA.
European concerns are compounded by Iran's perceived cooperation with Russia, particularly over drones and missiles used in the Ukraine conflict, which Europe views as a security threat. Divergences extend to regional issues, from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. Europe’s criticism of Iran’s domestic policies under the banner of human rights also underscores its attempts to influence Iran’s sovereignty, including questioning the Islamic Republic’s political foundations.
Iran, however, sees Europe as the party responsible for undermining the JCPOA. Iran argues that Europe failed to uphold its commitments after the US withdrawal from the agreement, leaving a vacuum that pushed Iran to invoke measures outlined in Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Iranian officials believe Europe unjustly condemned Tehran’s countermeasures rather than addressing the root causes. Furthermore, Iran criticises Europe for its selective approach to human rights, accusing it of ignoring Israeli actions in Gaza and hosting individuals whom Iran considers responsible for acts of terrorism against its citizens.
While rejecting European allegations of missile cooperation with Russia in the Ukraine war, Iran defends its defence partnerships with Moscow, asserting that pursuing national security is a legitimate right of all states. Tehran argues that it will not remain passive in the face of complex global security challenges.
An analysis of European think tank reports, official statements, and mainstream media reveals three schools of thought on how Europe should approach relations with Iran:
The first group views Iran as a significant threat to Europe. It supports aligning with the US “maximum pressure” strategy, initiated under President Donald Trump. Proponents argue that Europe should seize the opportunity to weaken Iran further, given the country’s internal economic and social challenges and setbacks in the region. They believe this is a strategic moment to push Iran toward major behavioural changes.
The second school of thought also considers Iran a threat but opposes direct involvement. Advocates of this view prefer to isolate Iran by cutting it off from the global economy. They believe this approach allows Europe to manage perceived threats without incurring the costs of active confrontation.
The third perspective sees Iran as both a threat and an opportunity. This group argues that Iran’s geopolitical importance and capabilities make isolation impractical and costly. It doubts the efficacy of the US maximum pressure policy and believes that blindly following it would harm Europe’s interests. According to this view, conflict with Iran would escalate threats to Europe, while a policy of engagement would offer more manageable outcomes.
This group also contends that if Iran were to reconcile with the US, Europe would be excluded from any resulting benefits. Conversely, if Iran adopted a strategy of resistance to maximum pressure, the consequences would similarly disadvantage Europe. Advocates of this approach believe dialogue is the only viable path forward, as it avoids framing Iran as an absolute threat and encourages negotiation on nuclear, regional, and other critical issues.
In Tehran, perspectives on engaging with Europe are equally divided into three main schools of thought:
The first group, with an ideological and historical outlook, opposes dialogue with Europe and the US. It argues that past experiences show Europe prioritises its own interests over mutual benefit and has never taken significant steps to address Iran’s concerns. This faction advocates for disengagement without escalating conflict.
The second group, composed of Iranian realists, believes Europe perceives itself as holding the balance of power and therefore approaches Iran from a position of superiority. These realists argue that Europe is politically subordinate to the US and lacks the ability to act independently. They see Europe as using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Washington. Consequently, they suggest that Iran focus on direct negotiations with the US, as Europe is likely to accept the outcomes of US-Iran talks regardless.
The third group, Iranian pragmatists, emphasises the long history of Iran-Europe relations, including political, economic, and cultural cooperation. They argue that engagement with Europe has historically contributed to security in the region. While recognising Europe’s limited influence on global decision-making, this group believes Europe still plays a significant role in international affairs. They advocate for balanced foreign policy, in line with the principle of “neither East nor West,” and see dialogue as the most effective means of addressing Iran’s issues with the West.
Among both Iranian and European policymakers, those favouring dialogue appear to be in the minority. This trend raises concerns about the potential closure of diplomatic channels. Blocking avenues for dialogue risks undermining the interests of both Iran and Europe. Pragmatism, however, offers a path to protect mutual interests and regional stability.
Seyed Rasoul Mousavi
Former Ambassador of Iran to Finland and Estonia
This is a "Viewpoint" opinion column. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of The Helsinki Times. This column is not fact checked and HT is not be responsible for any possible inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article.
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